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SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
The  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  is  scheduled  to  come  into  force 
on  1  January  1994.  It  Is  unique  in  that  it  wi II  I iberal ise  trade 
between  two  highly  developed  and  wealthy  countries  of  very  disparate 
size  - the  US  and  Canada  -and  a  third  partner,  at  a  very  different 
stage  of  development,  whose  per  capita  income  Is  estimated  at  about  one 
eighth  that  of  Its  richer  partners  and  of  whom  the  population  is 
expected  to  reach  100  mi II ion  by  the  end  of  this  century.  The  NAFTA 
represents  a  model  of  regional  integration differing  substantially  from 
any  European  arrangement,  and  based  on  the  hypothesis  that  free  trade  is 
a  sufficient  basis  for  economic  convergence.  The  effects  of  the  NAFTA 
on  its participants,  on  the  Community  and  on  other  non-members  fal I  into 
three  categories:  political,  trade  and  investment. 
The  implications  for  the  US  and  Canada  in  terms  of  their  bilateral 
relationship,  and  bilateral  trade  and  investment  flows,  can  be  expected 
to  be  minor;  significant  adjustments  have  already  taken  place  between 
them  following  the  entry  into  force  of  the  US/Canada  Free  Trade 
Agreement  in  1989.  With  regard  to  Mexico,  the  US  is  overwhelmingly  the 
major  trading  and  Investment  partner  of  that  country  and  can  clearly 
expect  to  expand  both  these  facets  in  the  context  of  the  NAFTA. 
Canada/Mexico  trade  and  investment  flows  are  tiny:  there  is  scope  for 
them  to  grow,  but  this  growth  is  not  expected  to  impact  more  than 
marginally  on  their  economies. 
Similarly,  the  Community's  political,  trade  and  investment  relations 
with  Canada  and  the  US  are  not  expected  to  be  affected  significantly  by 
the  NAFTA  In  the  short  term.  In  the  longer  term  it  is  not  excluded  that 
the  Community's  exports  may  suffer  some  displacement  on  the  US  and 
Canadian  markets,  but  a  considerable  evolution  in  the  Mexican  structure 
of  production  and  trade  is  likely  to  take  place  before  this  effect  is 
felt. - 4  -
In  the  meantime,  however,  the  Community  expects  its  political 
relationship with  Mexico  to  be  affected  by  Mexico's  participation  in  the 
NAFTA.  By  this  participation,  Mexico  is  expected  to  gradually  move 
towards  a  standard  of  economic  development  which  more  closely  resembles 
that  of  its  partners.  This  will  mean  that  it  will  similarly  achieve 
more  equality  in  Its  relationship  with  the  Community.  That  relationship 
has  been  and  is  being  fostered  by  both  sides.  As  the  NAFTA  draws  Mexico 
more  closely  into  the  North  American  orbit,  Mexico's  relationship  with 
the  Community  may  gain  importance  as  a  counterweight. 
As  Mexico's  second  largest  trading  partner  after  the  US,  the  Community 
has  already  benefited  from  the  increased  openness  and  growth  in  the 
Maxi can  economy  over  the  past  few  years,  a I though  Maxi co  st iII  on I  y 
represents  1.14%  of  total  Community  exports.  Some  displacement  of 
Community  exports  by  American  products  can  be  expected  as  tariffs 
between  the  partners  disappear  but  it  is  expected  that  the  dynamism 
generated  and  reinforced  In  Mexico  by  the  NAFTA  wi  I I  permit  a 
considerable  further  expansion of  trade with  the  Community. 
By  achieving  duty  free  access  to  one  of  the  largest  and  richest  markets 
in  the  world,  Mexico  wi  I I  become  one  of  the  most  attractive  investment 
destinations  for  third  countries,  Including  the  Community.  The 
Community  is  already  Mexico's  second  largest  source  of  direct  foreign 
Investment.  By  Jock I  ng  the  Mexican  economy  Into  a  market  orientated 
regional  grouping,  the  NAFTA  gives  Investors  considerable security.  The 
Community  is  therefore  likely  to  continue  Its  trend  towards  increased 
direct  Investment  In  Mexico. 
The  Community  does  perceive  potential  negative  impacts  on  its  interests 
arising  from  the  NAFTA,  and  in  some  cases  can  and  should  take  steps  to 
minimize  these.  Firstly,  where  the  external  tariffs  of  the  three 
parties  to  NAFTA  are  high,  and  the  corresponding  preference  between 
NAFTA  partners  is  consequently  greatest,  the  Community  can  endeavour  to 
negotiate  reductions  in  those  external  tariffs.  Secondly,  given  that 
many  of  the  non-tariff  benefits of  the  NAFTA  wi  I I  be  multi lateral ised on 
completion  of  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations,  the  NAFTA  represents  an 
added  incentive  for  the  Community  to  pursue  its  current  efforts  to - 5  -
conclude  that  agreement.  Thirdly,  In  certain  specific  sectors  (such  as 
textiles)  where  quotas  and  exemptions  will  be  reviewed  after  some  years 
the  CommunIty  shou 1  d  supper t  and  reinforce  the  efforts  of  those  NAFTA 
Interests  militating  in  favour  of  a  less  trade  distorting  situation. 
Fourthly,  In  any  case  where  a  NAFTA  partner  differentiates  between 
enterprises  established  in  the  NAFTA  area,  and  owned  by  NAFTA  nationals 
on  the  one  hand,  or  by  non-NAFTA  nationals  such  as  members  of  the 
Community  on  the  other  (for  example,  as  is  the  case  in  Canada  regarding 
Investment  screening),  the  Community  should  bring  pressure  to  bear  to 
ensure  that  Community  enterprises  duly  established  in  North  America  are 
not  discriminated  against  - just  as  foreign  companies  duly  established 
in  the  Community  are  treated  exactly  as  Community  owned  companies. 
Finally,  where  the  Community  perceives  that  in  the  agreement,  or  in  its 
implementing  legislation,  trade  provisions  appear  to  create  a  situation 
towards  non-NAFTA  members  which  is  more  restrictive  than  the  pre-NAFTA 
situation,  the  Community  should  actively  pursue  the  issues  in  the  GATT 
context. 
In  summary,  therefore,  and  notwithstanding  some  displacement  of  certain 
exports  of  the  Community  to  the  participants of  the  NAFTA,  the  impact  of 
the  NAFTA  on  the  Community  can  be  expected  to  be  felt  most  strongly  in 
terms  of  its  political  and  economic  relationship  with  Mexico;  that 
impact  is expected  to  be  globally  positive. - 6  -
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The  North  Amer lean  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA)  was  concluded  between 
negotiators  from  the  US,  Canada  and  Mexico  In  early  August  1992.  It  was 
signed  by  Presidents  Bush  and  Salinas  and  Prime  Minister  Mulroney  on  17 
December  1992  and,  if  ratified,  should  come  Into  force  on  1  January 
1994.  The  possible  extension  of  NAFTA  to  Include  other  partners  is  not 
to  be  excluded  In  the  future.  President  Bush  offered  In  June  1990  to 
get  more  nations  from  South  America  to  Join  the  US  in  a  free  trade area. 
In  Asia,  Korea  was  the  most  interested country.  It  has  been  pointed out 
by  authoritative  sources  that  the  conditions of  accession  to  NAFTA  were 
deliberately  drafted  in  rather  vague  terms,  with  the  purpose  of  leaving 
future  developments  in  the  hands  of  founder  NAFTA  members. 
The  NAFTA  agreement  has  been  negotiated wei  I  ahead  of  the  UR  and  appears 
to  have  precedence  on  the  US  political  agenda  over  other  trade  pol icy 
Issues  In  particular  the  UR  for  which  the  President  has  now  proposed  to 
renew  the  Fast  Track  procedure.  The  ratification process of  NAFTA  could 
wei  I  have  considerable  impact  on  the  attitude  which  the  US  takes  vis  a 
vis  the  UR  negotiations  as  wei  I  as  their  readiness  to  make  concessions 
in  sensitive negotiating areas,  such  as  textiles.  In  this  respect  it  is 
worth  noting  that  the  US  textile  lobby  has  recently  started  to  make 
clear  links  between  NAFTA  and  the  UR  by  seeking  changes  of  the  Draft 
Final  Act.  They  consider  that  they  have  already  made  enough  concessions 
under  the  NAFTA.  These  developments  would  be  particularly  regrettable, 
because  it  can  generally  be  assumed  that  the  economy  and  trade  effects 
of  a  positive  outcome  of  the  UR  should  outweigh  by  far  the  effects  of 
the  NAFTA  agreement. 
The  motivation  for  entering  Into  a  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement 
encompassed  both  economic  and  pol !tical  factors.  Clearly  each 
part iclpant  to  a  free  trade  agreement  enters  into  It  in  order  to 
stimulate  trade  between  the  partners  through  the  elimination  of  tariffs 
and  non-tariff  barriers.  The  objective  is  to  Increase  overal I  economic 
wei  !being  through  a  more  rational  allocation of  resources  and  increased 
competitivlty.  Apart  from  that  general  objective,  however,  each 
participant  normally  has  more  specific obJectives and  in  the  case of  the 
NAFTA  participants  these more  specific obJectives were  highly  diverse. 
Mexico  sought  a  NAFTA  because  of  the  current  government's  pol icy  of 
opening  Its  economy  in  order  to  encourage  Investment  and  move  towards  a 
higher  standard  of  I ivlng.  In  this  respect,  It  Is  interesting  to  note 
that  in  a  recent  speech  on  regional  agreements,  Mr.  Dunkel,  Director 
General  of  GATT,  said  that  in  his  view,  a  country  which  has  made  the 
fundamental  choice  to  open  up  to  the  world  can  show  very  good  sense  in 
pursuing  regional  trade  I iberal isation:  this  offers  economies  of  scale, 
opportunities  for  specialisation,  a  magnet  for  foreign  investment,  a 
stronger  collective  voice  in  the  world's  economic  counci Is,  and  often 
Important  political  gains  as  well.  These  obJectives  could  well  be  a 
summary  of  what  Mexico  has  sought  in  negotiating  the  NAFTA. 
To  ratify  the  NAFTA,  President  Sal lnas  needs  only  Senate  approval:  his 
party  holds  61  of  the 64  seats. 
There  has  been  1 ittle opposition  in  Mexico  to  the  NAFTA.  Although  it  is 
clear  that  there  wi  I I  be  adjustment  problems,  the  NAFTA  is  widely  seen 
as  advantageous  to  the  country  and  of  benefIt  to  the  majority  of  the 
population.  Those  opponents  who  have  voiced  concern  cite  fears  of  an 
Apr I I  199J - 7  -
Increase  of  US  influence  and  loss  of  Mexican  sovereignty.  The 
suggestion  Is  also  made  that  in  a  country  in  which  wealth  is  extremely 
unevenly  divided,  the  NAFTA  wll I  benefit  the  rich. 
The  ~  has  changed  its  approach  towards  regional  trade  groupings, 
Influenced  In  part  by  what  It  perceives  as  a  broad  trend  towards  such 
arrangements  (especially,  but  not  only,  in  Europe)  as  well,  perhaps,  as 
by  the  slow  progress  In  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations.  This  new 
approach  was  seen most  clearly  In  the  dynamic  attitude  taken  by  the  Bush 
administration  to  the  NAFTA  negotiations  and  its  clearly  stated 
wl  I I lngness  to  consider  extending  that  agreement  to  atone  Latin  American 
countries. 
More  specifically  regarding  Mexico,  the  US  interest  was  to  support  the 
efforts  of  Mexico's  President  Salinas;  to  consolidate  the  advantages 
gained  from  Mexico's  autonomous  reduction  in  barriers  to  trade  and 
Investment;  and  to  encourage  economic  growth  in  the  region,  in  order  to 
diminish  the  i I legal  immigration  from  Mexico.  In  addition,  given  the 
high  proportion  of  Mexican  income  spent  on  imports  from  the  US,  higher 
economic  growth  In  Mexico  is  clearly  in  the  interests of  the  US. 
In  the  US,  the  implementing  legislation  is  being  prepared  and  when  this 
goes  to  Congress,  it  must  be  agreed  or  rejected  90  session  days 
thereafter;  this  would  imply  approval  or  rejection  by  mid-1993.  The 
Agreement  has  been  presented  to Congress  already,  wei  I  before  the  expiry 
of  the  current  "fast  track"  authority  (which  runs  out  at  the  beginning 
of  March  and  under  which  Congress  can  accept  or  reject  but  cannot  change 
an  agreement). 
President  Clinton  has  expressed  himself  as  favourable  to  the  NAFTA.  In 
his  meeting  with  President  Salinas  on  8  January  1993,  however,  he 
reiterated  his  intention  to  negotiate  additional  protocols  or 
supplementary  agreements,  covering  in  particular  environmental  and 
labour  Issues,  as  wei  I  as  protection against  import  surges. 
It  is  not  yet  clear  what  content  such  protocols  should  have.  Certain 
members  of  Congress  emphasise  that  regarding  the  environment,  better 
enforcement  of  Mexican  I  aw  and  substantia I  c I  ean-up  projects  w  i I I  be 
sought.  Mexico  has  already  rejected  any  form  of  US  interference  in  how 
It  appl les  its  laws- and  any  suggestion of  US  extraterritoriality would 
be  resisted  strongly  by  Mexico,  as  well  as  constituting  a  cause  for 
concern  for  other  partners,  such  as  the  Community.  As  for  the 
posslbl I lty  of  clean-up  projects,  some  members  of  Congress  have 
suggested  that  this,  as  wei  I  as  worker  retraining,  should  be  funded  by  a 
transaction  tax.  This  is  fiercely  rejected  by  business  interests 
domestically.  Any  such  tax  would  also  require  careful  Community 
monitoring  both  for  its  GATT  compatibility  and  to  ensure  that 
transactions  which  do  not  benefit  from  NAFTA  preferences  would  be 
exempted.  Regarding  labour  issues,  Congress  argues  again  for  more 
effective  implementation  of  Mexican  laws  (potential 
extraterritorial lty),  and  seeks  retraining  programmes  to  be  financed  by 
the  transaction  tax.  Finally,  on  import  surges,  It  is unclear  what  type 
of  protocol  might  be  sought,  since protection  is  already  foreseen  in  the 
NAFTA  against  this situation. 
There  is  a  considerable  number  of  interest  groups  opposed  to  the  NAFTA. 
These  include  organised  labour,  which  fears  an  outflow of  investment  to 
Mexico  and  declining  wage  levels  in  the  US;  environmental  groups  express 
the  concern  that  env i ronmenta I  standards  w  i I I  be  I  owe red  in  the  US  to 
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meet  competition  from  less  strictly  regulated  Industry  in  Mexico; 
various  agricultural  sectors  fear  Mexican  competition;  the  film  and 
medIa  industry  object  to  the  genera I  exempt ion  to  NAFTA  rules  granted 
for  Canadian  cultural  industries;  and  there  are  others.  Now  that 
President  Clinton  has  made  it  clear  that  he  does  not  intend  to 
renegotiate  the  deal  but  rather  add  to  it,  the  question  arises  whether 
the  var lous  interests  out lined  above  can  muster  adequate  support  in 
Congress  to  delay  passage  of  the  NAFTA.  As  at  end  February,  the 
majority  of  commentators  consider  that  NAFTA  is  I lkely  to  pass  in 
Congress;  but  opposition  is  becoming  more  vocal.  It  is  not  clear, 
moreover  how  President  Clinton's  intention  to  negotiate  the  protocols 
referred  to  previously  will  Impact  upon  the  timetable  for  presentation 
of  the  Implementation  legislation  to  Congress  and  its  ratification,  but 
US  Trade  Representative  Kantor  assured  the  Senate  (on  9  March  1993)  that 
he  wl  I I  not  seek a~  on  the  NAFTA  implementing  legislation  unti I  his 
negotiations  "result  in  comprehensive,  enforceable  agreements". 
Canada  was  the  most  reluctant  participant.  The  original  Canadian  motive 
for  a  bilateral  free  trade  agreement  with  the  US,  which  led  to  the  Free 
Trade  Agreement  which  entered  Into  force  In  1989,  was  to  protect  itself 
from  what  it  perceived  as  US  harassment.  If  the  US  had  then  entered 
into  further  bilateral  agreements  with  Mexico  and  other  Central  and 
Latin  American  states,  this  could  have  led  to  the  dilution  of  the 
Canadian  special  position  on  the  US  market  without  any  compensating 
benefit  of  access  to  other  third  countries.  Canada,  therefore,  saw  its 
interest  to  avoid  the  strengthening  of  the  position  of  the  US  which 
would  have  resulted  from  a  so-cal led  "hub  and  spokes"  arrangement  (under 
which  the  US  would  have  free  trade  agreements  with  many  countries  but 
those  countries would  not  have  free  trade  arrangements  with  each  other). 
In  Canada,  the  implementing  legislation,  when  prepared,  must  go  through 
the  Committee  stages  in  both  the  House  and  the  Senate  and  will  then  be 
voted  In  Pari lament,  where  his  large  Progressive  Conservative  majority 
wi  I I  ensure  approval. 
Public objection  to  the  NAFTA  Is,  thus  far,  considerably  more  muted  than 
the  opposition  which  faced  the  US/Canada  Free  Trade  Agreement  in  the 
course  of  1988.  At  that  time,  the  two  main  political  parties  in 
opposition  and  a  broad  coalition  of  interests  ranging  from  organised 
labour  through  minority  groups  (women,  Indians)  to  ardent  nationalists 
objected  to  the  FTA.  An  election  was  effectively  fought  on  the  issue 
and  the  government  (and  the  FTA)  won  by  a  narrow  margin.  It  is  clear 
that  the  effects  of  the  NAFTA  on  the  Canadian  economy  wi  I I  be 
considerably more  marginal  than  the effects of  the  FTA,  and  this should, 
at  first  sight,  ensure  relatively  easy  passage  of  the  NAFTA.  However, 
feelings  about  the  US/Canada  FTA  are  sti I I  extremely  divided,  and 
considerably  heated;  the  coalition  of  interests  against  the  FTA  claim 
that  experience  has  born  out  their  thesis  and  that  the  FTA  has  been  bad 
for  canada  -by analogy,  the  NAFTA  wi  I 1 be  worse.  Supporters of  the  FTA 
claim  that  the  opposite  is  true. 
The  main  specific objections  voiced  in  Canada  to  the  NAFTA  so  far  relate 
to  the  risk  of  decl inlng  wages  and  an  outflow of  Investment  (as  in  the 
US  case),  the  environmental  problem,  the  automobile  sector  and  textiles. 
For  automobiles,  the  Auto  Pact  which  since  1965  has  governed  trade  in 
this  sector  with  the  US  and  which  has  been  hugely  beneficial  to  Canada 
had  required  a  60%  Canadian  content;  the  NAFTA,  on  the  other  hand, 
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requires  a  62.5%  North  American  content.  For  textiles,  strict  rules  of 
origin  are  expected  to  be  detrimental  to  Canada's  important  garment 
Industry,  which  depends  to  a  large  extent  on  imported  textiles. 
The  Progressive  Conservative  government  of  Prime  Minister  Mulroney  has 
currently  a  very  low  level  of  support  among  the  population,  according  to 
the  pol Is.  The  Government  must  face  an  election  by  Autumn  1993.  Should 
the  opposition  parties  decide  to  run  on  an  anti-NAFTA  platform,  it  is 
not  excluded  (If  not  very  I lkely)  that  Canada  would  in  the  end  seek  to 
renegotiate  the  NAFTA. 
I I .  BAS I  C OAT A 
The  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  wi  I I  create  the  second  largest 
free  trade  agreement  in  the  world  after  the  European  Economic  Area 
(EEA).  The  population  of  the  NAFTA  (some  360  mi  I I ion)  is  slightly  less 
than  that  of  the  EEA  (375  million,  without  Switzerland).  The  Gross 
National  Product  of  the  18  countries  participating  in  the  EEA  is 
estimated  at  $US  7  trillion,  compared  to  the  GNP  of  NAFTA- $US  6.2 
tr iII ion. 
The  rules of  the  NAFTA  are  in  some  cases  comparable  to  the  EEA.  Both  go 
further  than  traditional  free  trade  agreements,  but  the  EEA  goes 
considerably  further  than  the  NAFTA.  Not  only  does  it  eliminate 
barriers  on  substantially  all  intra-EEA  trade,  but  goes  further  and 
eliminates also barriers on  alI  movement  of  labour  and  capital.  After  a 
transitional  period  the  market  In  services  will  be  free  and  there  will 
be  no  screening  of  investments.  In  the  EEA  the  closer  integration 
foreseen,  Including  in  the  area  of  competition  pol icy,  means  that 
neither  anti-dumping  nor  countervailing  duties  will  be  applied  by  any 
member  of  the  EEA  against  another.  In  the  NAFTA,  on  the  other  hand, 
investments  screening  remains  in  many  cases;  the  free  trade  in  services 
is  subject  to  the  maintenance  of  most  of  the  existing  limitations;  and 
anti-dumping  and  countervailing  duties  can  sti II  be  applied,  albeit 
within  the  context  of  an  elaborate dispute  settlement  mechanism. 
However,  any  comparison  between  the  EEA  and  the  NAFTA  is  necessar i I  y 
very  superficial  because  the  defining  characteristics  of  the  partners 
are  so  different.  In  marked  contrast  to  the  EEA,  the  NAFTA  is  a 
partnership  of  two  highly  developed  and  wealthy  countries  with  a  third 
developing  country. 
The  size  of  populations  of  the  participants  ranges  from  250  million  in 
the  US  to 85  mi  I I ion  in  Mexico  and  27  mi  I I ion  in  Canada.  Whereas  the  US 
and  Canada  enjoy  per  capita  income  levels  of  $US  25,000-30,000,  the  per 
capita  income  in  Mexico  Is  recently  estimated  to  have  increased 
significantly  to  $US  3,600.  In  fact,  with  one  third  Mexico's 
population,  Canada's  gross  domestic  product  is  almost  three  times  that 
of  Mexico.  Furthermore,  the  uneven  distribution  of  wealth  in  Mexico 
means  that  the  average  faml  ly  income  there  is sti I I  only  about  one  tenth 
that  of  Its  North  American  partners. 
Wage  levels  In  Mexico,  at  just  $US  2/hour,  are  very  significantly  below 
US  and  Canadian  levels. 
Apr I I  1993 - 10  -
Table  1 
Hourly  manufacturing  comoensatlon  costs  for  production workers 
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hour  costs 
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+13.2  +20.6 
It  Is  clear  that  Mexican  wage  costs  are  rising  very  much  faster  than 
those  In  the  US  and  Canada.  It  Is  also  suggested  that  much  of  the 
difference  In  wage  costs  Is  balanced  by  lower  productivity  In  Mexico. 
Nevertheless,  the  wage  cost  advantage  In  Mexico  Is  considered  to  be  one 
of  the  major  factors  encouraging  the  recent  Inflow  of  foreign  direct 
Investment  Into Mexico  (see  Section  Ill  below). 
Another  area  In  which  the  US  and  Canada  enJoy  similar  levels  of  wealth 
and  productivity,  and  Mexico  Is  In  a  radically  different  situation,  Is 
that  of  agriculture.  Agriculture  employs  23%  of  economically  active 
Mexicans,  but  represents only  7%  of  gross  domestic  product.  In  spite of 
potentially  fertile  land,  and  a  favourable  climate,  Mexico  has  become  a 
net  Importer  of  food  since  1989.  The  cause  of  this  situation  lies 
mainly  In  antiquated  land  laws,  which  are  now  being  changed.  Further, 
under  the  NAFTA,  tariffs  and  other  barriers  between  Mexico  and  the  US 
will  be  phased  out  and  Internal  prices will  be  reduced  to  International 
levels.  This  Is  likely  to  make  several  ml I I Jon  smal I  corn  and  other 
producers  non-viable;  Income  payments  are  expected  to  help  cushion  the 
Inevitable  flow  from  the  land  but  will  clearly not  prevent  it. 
The  foregoing  data  gives  some  Indication of  the  differences  between  the 
US  and  Canada,  on  the one  hand,  and  Mexico  on  the other,  as  they  prepare 
for  the  NAFTA. 
With  regard  to  trade  within  the  future  NAFTA  region,  a  very  significant 
Increase  In  this  Intra-regional  trade  has  already  taken  place  over  the 
past  ten  years  with  the  total  rising  from  US$  110  billion  In  1980  to 
US$  235  bill !on  In  1990.  The  fo! lowing  table shows  export  trade  between 
the  three  NAFTA  partners  In  1989. 
Table  2 
lotra-MAFTA  t[~d§,  1~e~ 
US$  b I I I I  on 
Exports  f[om  .!Q  us.  Canada  M§XICO  Others 
us  78  25.0  260 
Canada  85  0.5  35.5 
Mexico  28  1.5  4.6 
Apr II  19113 Both  Canada  and  Mexico  send  75-85%  of  their  exports  to  the  US  and  import 
approximately  70%  of  all  imports  from  that  source.  Canadian/Mexican 
trade  Is  very  tiny,  and  although  the  effects  of  the  prospective 
agreement  are  already  being  felt  in  the  Increased  level  of  interest 
being  shown  In  Mexico  by  Canada  and  vice-versa,  the  effects  of  the 
projected  Increase  in  bilateral  trade  on  the  two  economies,  and  on  their 
third  country  trading  partners,  is  expected  to  be  insignificant, 
compared  to  the  effects on  Mexico  of  opening  up  its markets  even  further 
to  the  us. 
I I I.  EFFECTS  OF  NAFTA 
Given  the  relative  sizes  of  the  three  economies  participating  in  the 
NAFTA,  It  Is  obvious  that  the  US  will,  In  a  certain  sense,  be  the  least 
affected  in  global  terms.  US  exports  to Canada  are  significant  - 21%  of 
total  exports  - but  the  NAFTA  does  not  expand  on  the  FTA  in  a  manner 
which  would  lead  to  major  changes  in  US/Canadian  trade.  US  exports  to 
Mexico  represent  7%  of  tot  a I  US  exports;  the  us  expects,  probab 1 y 
correctly,  a  very  major  increase  in  these  exports  but  even  this  is 
unlikely  to  change  the  structure  of  the  US  economy,  except  in  a  few 
limited  sectors.  Clearly  the  effect  of  a  free  trade  agreement  with  a 
major  trade  partner  is  always  most  significant  for  the  smaller  partner. 
It  would  appear  I ikely  that  Canada  wi  I I  undergo  considerably  less  change 
as  a  result  of  the  NAFTA  than  that  provoked  by  its  US/Canada  FTA.  Four 
years  ago  the  FTA  came  into  force.  It  Is  instructive  to  have  a  brief 
look  at  the  apparent  results of  that  Agreement. 
In  the  four  years  since  the  FTA  came  Into  force  Canada  has  increased  its 
exports  to  the  US  and  marginal IY  increased  its  share  of  the  US  market. 
The  proportion  of  total  Canadian  exports  has  remained  more  or  less 
constant  at  77%.  However,  in  the  same  period  the  Canadian  dollar 
appreciated  by  nearly  20%  compared  to  the  US  dollar  (although  it  has 
fallen  back  In  the  last  six  months),  and  the  us  has  suffered  a  major 
recession.  Supporters  of  the  FTA  argue  that  these  latter  two  factors 
would  have  had  a  very  negative  impact  on  Canadian  exports  to  the  US  in 
the  absence  of  the  FTA;  opponents  of  the  FTA  point  to  the  number  of  Job 
losses  In  Canada  over  the  past  few  years  through  a  difficult 
restructuring  of  industry  and  claim  that  no  benefits  have  been  felt  in 
the  I lfe of  the  ordinary  Canadian. 
Irrespective  of  the  final  judgement, 
exper lance  over  the  past  four  years 
indication of  what  Mexico  can  expect. 
j t  is 
cannot 
clear  that  the  Canadian 
in  any  way  serve  as  an 
For  Mex  leo  the  conclusion  of  the  NAFTA  indicates  a  wi  II ingness  and  a 
possibi I ity  to  enter  into  a  completely  different  economic  order, 
dominated  by  market  orientation.  Economic  reform  started  with  Mexico's 
accession  to  the  GATT  in  1986  and  has  been  vigorously  pursued  by 
President  Salinas  since  his  election  in  1988.  This  has  already  started 
to  change  the  face  of  the  Mexican  economy.  Per  capita  income  has 
increased  from  some  $US  2.000/head  to  nearly  $US  4.000  and  it  is  clearly 
Mexico's  ambition  to  achieve  a  standard  of  living  comparable  to  its - 12  -
partners,  whIch  wou I  d  i nvo I  ve  a  six fo I  d  increase  in  income.  However, 
these  developments  must  take  place  in  a  country  where  wealth  is 
currently unevenly  distributed and  the  social  deficit  is  significant. 
Since  1986,  the  Mexican  economy  is  no  longer  driven  by  an  effort  at 
Import  substitution  but  by  the  desire  for  export-led  growth.  Tariffs, 
import  quotas  and  other  trade  barriers  have  been  slashed  or  eliminated. 
MaJor  state-run  companies  have  been  privatised.  Foreign  direct 
investment  has  been  encouraged  (and  has  increased  from  $US  14.6  bi  11  ion 
in  1985  to  $US  33  billion  In  1991),  of  which  over  20%  originates  in 
Western  Europe. 
Table  3 
Cumulative  foreign  direct  investment  in  Mexico 
Year  IQ!Al  us  GermAn:t  UK  Japan  France  switzer I  ~nd 
$  mlo.  X  X  X  X  X  X 
1980  8.459  69  8  3  6  1  6 
1985  14.629  67  8  3  6  2  5 
1991  33.874  63  6  6  5  4  4 
In  the  five  years  to  1991,  US  exports  to  Mexico  have  increased  very 
significantly,  as  have  Community  exports.  As  is  normal  under  these 
circumstances,  imports  into  Mexico  have  increased  much  faster  than 
exports  from  Mexico. 
Table  4 
Trade  with  M~xicQ {main  g:artners 
biQ.  ECU 
EXPORTS  to Mexico  IMPORTS  from  Mexico 
from  QS.  g  ~  us  EC  h12m 
1970  1.  704  515  94  1. 219  163  151 
1985  17.552  2.739  1.303  25.360  5.525  2.450 
1991  26.747  4.734  2.274  25.636  2.962  1. 405 
The  resulting  current  account  deficit  has  grown  significantly  from 
US$  11.1  bi II  ion  in  1991  to  US$  18.7  bi II ion  in  1992.  Imports  are 
estimated  to  be  approximately  66%  for  consumer  goods,  with  the  rest  for 
investment.  ThIs  deficit  has  been  ba I  anced  by  the  increase  in  funds 
flowing  in  for  investment,  referred  to  above. 
For  the  first  few  years  of  the  NAFTA,  this  trend  may  be  expected  to 
con t i nue,  presumab 1 y  with  an  increased  emphasis  on  capita I  goods  as 
Mexico  establ lshes  its  infrastructure  and  as  its  industry adjusts  to  new 
competitive  pressures.  But  the  longer-term outlook  for  Mexico  is  one  of 
dynamic  growth.  A vital  component  of  that  growth  wi  I I  be  the  expected 
emergence  of  a  large  middle  class,  in  the  context  of  a  fast  growing 
population with  a  concomitant  rise  in  consumer  demand. 
The  political  effects of  the  NAFTA  are  even  more  difficult  to  assess  at 
this point.  When  this Agreement  is  ratified,  it  wi  II  undoubtedly  signal 
a  sea  change  ln  the  relationship  between  Mexico  and  its  North  American 
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partners;  this  new  relationship  wi  II  no 
relations  of  the  other  Latin  American 
Northern  neighbours.  This  could  clearly 
Community's  own  relationship  with  Mexico. 
longer  be  comparable  to  the 
countries  with  their  large 
have  implications  for  the 
Furthermore,  the  NAFTA  contains  an  accession  clause  which  opens  the 
posslbl I lty  of  membership  to  any  other  third  countries  who  are 
acceptable  to  the  three  original  participants.  It  is  expected  that 
Latin  American  countries  wi  I I  seek  membership- indeed,  discussions  with 
Chile  have  already  started.  The  political  implications of  a  free  trade 
area  covering  the  Americas  in  their  entirety must  also  be  assessed. 
The  trade  effects of  the  NAFTA  on  third  countries,  and  on  the  Community 
In  particular  wl  II  depend,  to  a  considerable  extent,  on  the  degree  to 
which  the  trade  creating effects  of  the  NAFTA  (in  particular  due  to  the 
new  dynamism  in  Mexico)  outweigh  the  trade  diverting  effects  which  are 
the  natural  result  of  preferences  accorded  between  the  partners  and  the 
desire  to  ensure  that  on I  y  the  partners  to  the  agreement  benefit  from 
those  preferences.  This  natural  trade  diversion  may,  however,  be 
exaggerated  In  certain  sectors  by  excessively  severe  preferential  rules 
of  origin  (see  Section  V).  However,  If  the  NAFTA  achieves  the 
objectives  of  its  participants  and  in  particular  of  Mexico,  the  demand 
generated  by  a  growing  population  with  a  standard  of  living  which  is 
rising  rapidly  from  a  very  low  base  should  benefit  all  NAFTA  trade 
partners,  and  not  just  the  participants. 
The  success  or  failure  of  the  Uruguay  Round  will  also  be  a  major 
determinant  of  the  effects  of  the  NAFTA  on  non-members  because  much  of 
the  NAFTA  Is  comparable  to  agreements  which  would  come  into  force  under 
that  Round  (In  areas  such  as  services  and  intellectual  property).  If 
the  Uruguay  Round  Is  successfu I,  many  of  the  preferences  granted  by 
NAFTA  partners  to  each  other  would  in  effect  become  MFN,  or  applicable 
to  alI  GATT  members. 
Finally,  particularly  for  the  Community,  the  effects of  the  NAFTA  in  the 
investment  area  are  crucial:  It  Is  clear  that  the  NAFTA  facilitates 
Investment  from  the  US  and  Canada  in  the  fast  developing  Mexican 
economy.  It  is  also  clear  that  Canada  maintains  more  severe  investment 
screening  thresholds  in  the  NAFTA  not  only  towards  non-NAFTA  members  but 
also  towards  third country enterprises  duly established  in  North  America 
but  not  wholly  owned  by  North  American  nationals  a  situation 
unacceptable  to  the  Community.  However,  one  of  the  reasons  that  Mexico 
engaged  In  the  NAFTA  negotiations,  and  that  Canada  also  participated 
fully,  was  to  increase  their  attractiveness as  investment  destinations. 
It  is  therefore  in  the  interests  of  Mexico  and  Canada,  as  well  as  the 
United  States,  not  to  make  investment  by  non-members  such  as  the 
Community  more  difficult. 
IV.  REACTIONS  TO  THE  NAFTA 
The  successful  conclusion  of  the  negotiations  leading  to  the  NAFTA  met 
with  varied  responses  throughout  the  world. 
Central  and  LatIn  Amer lean  countries  as  well  as  participants  in  the 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  have  expressed  deep  concern  that  the 
preferences  granted  to  Mexico  wi  II  necessar i I  y  give  Mexico  enormous 
advantages  In  sectors  of  vital  Importance  to  their  economies,  although 
these  disadvantages  will  be  mitigated  by  Latin  America's  relatively 
generous  treatment  by  the  US  under  the  GSP  system.  For  most  of  those 
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countries,  the  US  is  to  an  overwhelming  extent  their  most  important 
export  market.  They  have  expressed  serious  concern  that  in  particular 
for  agricultural  exports,  textiles,  leather  and  parts  and  components, 
they  will  lose  market  share  to  the  benefit  of  Mexico  and  with  serious 
effects  on  their  economies.  They  further  fear  diversion  of  much  needed 
investment  funds  to  Mexico;  70%  of  all  US  foreign  direct  investment  in 
developing  countries  has  tended  to  be  in  Latin  America  with  Brazi 1 
leading Mexico  In  the  past  as  the  first  and  second  destinations. 
Asian  countries  have  expressed  similar  fears  regarding  trade  competition 
from  Mexico  and  Investment  fund  diversion,  referring  in  particular  to 
those  important  Investment  flows  which  are  directed  systematically  to 
low  cost  labour  countries  with  access  to  the  US  market.  Asian  concerns 
also  relate  to  a  perceived  risk  of  a  "fortress  North  America".  This 
perception  Is  heightened  by  the  severity of  rules of origin  in  the  NAFTA 
for  certain  sectors  (textIles,  automobiles),  sectors of  major  importance 
to  those  countries. 
An  analysis  of  the  possible  effects  of  the  NAFTA  on  Australia  drew  the 
conclusion  that  certain  agricultural  exports  such  as  beef,  fruit  and 
vegetables  and  sugar,  could  suffer  from  trade  diversion  as  could  some 
motor  vehicle  parts  and  other  manufactured  products.  This  analysis  also 
suggested  the  risk:  of  negative  indirect  effects  in  terms  of  supplying 
raw  material  inputs  such  as  coal,  metals,  components,  wool  and  cotton, 
to  Asia  if  Mexico  (and  subsequently  other  Latin  American  countries) 
benefit  from  preferential  treatment  over  Asia  in  textiles,  clothing  and 
footwear,  consumer  electronics  and  I ight  manufacturing.  The  example  was 
given  of  a  decline  in  automotive  component  exports  from  Australia  to 
Japan  if  US  imports  of  motor  veh i c 1  es  were  diver  ted  from  Japan  to 
Mexico. 
The  Community  Is  in  favour,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  of  alI  free  trade 
agreements  which  respect  the  pertinent  GATT  rules.  The  Community  is, of 
course,  aware  that  its  exports  may  face  tougher  competition  on  the  us 
and  Canadian  markets  when  the  NAFTA  enters  Into  force,  in  sectors  where 
North  American  tariffs  are  high  and  Mexico  will  have  a  commensurate 
benefit.  Similarly,  the  expected  growth  in  the  Mexican  market  is  I ikely 
to  be  to  the  advantage,  first  and  foremost,  of  the  US  and  Canada. 
However,  such  trade  diversion  wi II,  in  principle,  be  compensated  by 
trade  creation  through  the  dynamism  normally  created  by  a  free  trade 
agreement. 
In  the  I ight  of  GATT  rules  concerning  the  formation  of  free  trade 
agreements  (Article  XXIV  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade) 
such  trade  diversion,  if  it  occurs,  is  considered  to  be  a  natural 
consequence  of  a  free  trade  agreement  and  not  to  give  any  trade  partner 
(such  as  the  Community  in  this  case)  a  right  to  compensation<n.  In 
particular,  Article  XXIV.5  provides  that  duties  and  other  trade 
regulations  governing  trade  with  non-participating  countries  should  be 
no  more  restrictive  after  the  creation  of  a  free  trade  agreement  than 
they  were  before  it  came  into  being.  The  assessment  of  the  NAFTA  in 
this  I ight  wi II  take  place  in  the  GATT.  Furthermore,  the  Understanding 
in  the  Uruguay  Round  on  the  interpretation of  Article  XXIV  provides  the 
(1)  Article  XXIV  only  foresees  the  right  to  compensation  where  customs 
unions  are  created,  leading  to  an  increase  in  tariffs  in  the 
partner/partners  in  the  union  which  had  lower  tariffs than  the  final 
common  customs  tariff. 
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possibility to  Invoke  the  GATT  dispute settlement mechanism  with  respect 
to any  matter  arising  from  the  appl !cation of  a  free  trade  agreement  (or 
Indeed  of  a  customs  union). 
In  the meantime  and  In  the  absence  of  the  legislative texts  Implementing 
the  NAFTA,  an  examination of  the  Agreement  has  brought  to  light  a  number 
of  aspects  of  actual  or  potential  concern  to  the  Community.  These 
aspects  are  summarised  In  Section V below. 
V  MAIN  COMMUNITY  CONCERNS  REGARDING  NAFTA 
The  elimination of  tariffs between  NAFTA  partners will  affect  Community 
exports most  In  areas where  tariffs remain  high  towards  third countries. 
To  the  extent  that  tariffs are  reduced  ln·the  Uruguay  Round,  the  Impact 
of  NAFTA  preferences  on  the  Community  and  other  third  countries  will  of 
course  be  diminished.  Given  that  Canada  and  Mexico  already  send  75%  of 
their  exports  to  the  US,  and  In  light  of  relative  tariff  levels  at  the 
start  of  operation  of  the  NAFTA,  tar Iff  reduct Ions  are  I lkely  In  the 
shorter  term  to  result  In  an  Increase  of  US  exports  to  Mexico.  This, 
therefore,  Is  the  market  In  which  the  community  may  face  most  Increased 
competition  through  NAFTA  tariff preferences. 
In  the  areas  of  financial  services.  Insurance  and  investment,  the  major 
problem  raised  Is  the  possibility  that  In  these  sectors  the  benefits of 
the  NAFTA  be  I Jmlted  to companies  which  are maJority  owned/control led  by 
NAFTA  nationals.  This  Is  contrary  to  Community  practice  towards 
foreign-owned  firms  established  In  the  Community  and  in  the  European 
Economic  Area  and  would  constitute  a  very  Important  and  unJustified 
discrimination  against  Community  owned/control led  subsidiaries  In  North 
America.  Canada,  for  example,  limits  certain  NAFTA  related  advantages 
In  the  financial  services  sector  to  firms  owned  or  control led  by  NAFTA 
nationals  (although  It  has  offered  to  limit  this restriction within  the 
context  of  a  successful  conclusion  of  the  GATS  - General  Agreement  on 
Trade  In  Services). 
With  regard  to  Investment,  It  Is  not  clear  to  what  extent  performance 
requirements,  which  are  el Jmlnated  for  NAFTA  partners,  are  eliminated 
also  for  non-NAFTA  partners.  What  Is  clear  Is  that  Investment  screening 
Is still  applicable  to  third countries.  However,  as mentioned  above,  it 
Is  considered unlikely  that  Mexico  or  Indeed  Its  two  NAFTA  partners will 
seek  to  raise  obstacles  against  foreign  Investment  (except  perhaps  in 
specific,  sensitive sectors). 
The  area  of  services  Is  one  In  which  a  Uruguay  Round  agreement  (General 
Agreement  on  Trade  In  Services)  wll I  ensure  that  most  of  the  benefits of 
the  NAFTA  wl  II  be  multi lateral lsed;  the  absence  of  such  multilateral Ism 
could  lead  to  considerable  trade  diversion  In  the  services  sector,  to 
the  detriment  of  Community  trade  In  services  and  particularly  to  its 
potential  trade  In  services with  Mexico. 
Ryles  of origin at  least  for  cars and  textiles are more  restrictive than 
In  the  FTA  (or  In  the  EEA).  Although  not  contrary  to  GATT,  this  is 
clearly  against  the  Interests  of  exporters  of  car  parts  to  Canada  and 
Mexico  (whose  car  exports  are  almost  entirely  directed  to  the  US).  For 
textiles,  stricter rules of origin are  somewhat  compensated  by  Increased 
exemptions  to  those  rules;  but  Community  Industry  does  expect  to  suffer 
loss  of  market  share.  particularly  In  Canada  which  habitually  Imported 
yarns  and  fabrics  to  produce  garments  for  export  to  the  US.  In  this 
respect  It  Is encouraging  to  note  that  Canada  has  announced  a  unilateral 
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decrease  In  Its  external  tariff  on  textiles- this  move  is  in  response 
to  Canadian  apparel  manufacturers,  and  will  benefit  the  Community  and 
other  suppl lers of  textIles  to  Canada. 
In  agriculture,  Canada  chose  to  maintain  Its  supply  management  for 
dairy,  poultry  and  eggs  and  has  therefore  a  bilateral  agreement  with 
Mexico  excluding  those  sectors.  The  US/Mexico  bilateral  deal  in 
agriculture  appears  to  give  major  advantages  to  both  parties.  In  the 
Mexican  market  Community  exports of  dairy  products,  sugar  and  meat  could 
suffer  from  competition  from  the  us. 
In  particular  for  sugar,  a  provision of  the  NAFTA  states  that  six  years 
after  Implementation,  Mexican  protection  in  the  sugar  sector  shall  be 
equivalent  to  US  protection.  Since  the  US  sugar  market  is  one  of  the 
most  protected  In  the  world,  the  Community  is  concerned  that  this 
provision may  mean  an  increase  In  protection  for  sugar  in  Mexico. 
One  Article  in  the  agricultural  chapter  of  the  NAFTA  refers specifically 
to  export  subsidies,  and  allows  for  a  signatory  (say  Mexico)  to  be 
prompted  by  another  signatory  (say  the  US)  into  agreeing  to  specific 
measures" ...  to counter  the effect of  any  such  subsidized  imports".  No 
reference  is  made  in  the  Article  to  the  need  for  such  measures  to 
respect  the  relevant  provisions of  the  GATT. 
As  in  the  FTA,  It  is  proposed  In  the  NAFTA  that  dispute  settlement  on  an 
issue  which  Is  GATT-related  may  take  place  either  under  the  procedures 
of  the  NAFTA  or  in  the  GATT  (and  Indeed,  there  are  additional  provisions 
which  would  tend  to  lead  to  greater  use  of  the  NAFTA  procedures).  This 
would  raise  a  potential  problem  of  conflicting  interpretations  of  GATT 
provisions;  procedural  confl lets  could  also arise  (for  example,  recently 
an  FTA  member  delayed  the  adoption  of  a  GATT  Panel  report  unti I  the  FTA 
had  ruled  on  the  same  issue).  For  these  reasons,  the  interests of  GATT 
Contracting Parties  could  be  affected. 
Customs  user  fees:  the  NAFTA  provides  that  these  US  fees  should  not  be 
charged  on  NAFTA  origin  products.  The  GATT  provides  that  such  fees 
shal I  be  I lmited  to  the  approximate  cost  of  the  services  rendered.  The 
Community  wi  II  have  to  ensure  that  fees  which  are  not  levied  on  NAFTA 
trade  shall  not  be  recuperated  by  an  increase  in  fees  for  third  country 
trade. 
In  the  section  dealing  with  Intellectual  property,  NAFTA  provides  for 
so-cal led  "plpel lne  protection"  for  pharmaceutical  and  agrochemical 
Inventions.  This  clause  creates  an  obligation  for  Mexico  to  grant  for 
US  and  Canadian  product  inventions  for  which  at  present  no  product 
patents  are  available under  Mexican  law,  a  special  patent  protection  for 
the  remaInder  of  the  patent  term  in  the  US  or  Canada.  It  is  obvious 
that  this  provision  creates  a  potentially serious  discrimination against 
Community  patent  right  holders. 
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SUMMARY  OF  CONTENTS  OF  THE  NAFTA 
The  following  is  a  summary  of  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement 
between  the  United  States,  Canada  and  Mexico. 
Chapter  1:  ObJectives 
To  formally  establIsh  a  free  trade  area  between  the  United  States,Canada 
and  Mexico  that  Is  consistent  with  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade.  To  el imlnate  barriers  to  trade,  promote  conditions  of  fair 
competition  and  increase  investment  opportunities.  The  Agreement 
estab I i shes  that  the  NAFTA  takes  priority  over  other  agreements  to  the 
extent  there  Is  any  conflict. 
Chapter  2:  Definitions 
This  chapter  defines  words  and  terms  particular  to  the  Agreement. 
Chapter  3:  National  Treatment  and  Market  Access  for  Goods 
Each  Party  shal I  accord  national  treatment  to  the  goods  of  another  Party 
(in  accordance  with  Article  I I I  of  GATT).  customs  Duties  wi  I I  either  be 
eliminated or  phased  out  in  five or  ten  years,  and  for  certain sensitive 
items  (Category  C+),  shal I  be  removed  in  fifteen  equal  stages  beginning 
from  1  January  1994  when  the  Agreement  comes  into  force. 
Annex  300-A:  Trade  and  Investment  in  the  Automotive  Sector 
The  Parties  have  agreed  to  progressively  eliminate  barriers  to  trade 
between  them  in  this sector,  but  have  simultaneously  tightened  the  Rules 
of  Origin  which  wi  I I  affect  third  country  exports.(cf.  Chapter  4  Rules 
of Origin). 
Annex  300-B:  Textile  and  Apparel  Goods 
This  relates  to  trade  in  fibres,  yarns,  fabrics  and  clothing  in  the 
North  American  Market.  In  scope,  the  NAFTA  takes  precedence  over  any 
other  existing  or  future  agreement  applicable  to  trade  in  textile  or 
apparel  goods  including  the Multi-Fibre  Agreement. 
Chapter  4:  Rules  of  Origin 
The  basic  principles  for  determining  the  NAFTA  origin  of  a  product  are 
the  same  as  those  applied  by  the  Community  in  the  EEA  context.  To 
calculate  the  value  added  the  NAFTA  provides  for  both  the  Transaction 
Value  Method  and  the  Net  Cost  Method.  For  motor  vehicles  however,  the 
Net  Cost  method  is  obligatory.  The  North  American  content  for  motor 
veh i c I  es  has  been  set  at  62.5%  compared  to  on I  y  50%  in  the  US-Canada 
Free  Trade  Agreement  (although  the  method  of  calculation  has  changed  so 
that  a  direct  comparison  is  not  possible). 
Chapter  5:  Customs  Procedures 
A  Certificate  of  Origin  shal I  be  introduced  certifying  that  goods 
originate  in  one  of  the  three  Parties  to  the  Agreement.  A Certificate 
shal I  not  be  required  for  a  commercial  good  whose  value  does  not  exceed 
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$US  1,000.  This  chapter  also  Includes  rules  for  the  Administration  and 
Enforcement,  Origin  Verifications,  Penalties,  Review  and  Appeals  and 
general  definitions. 
Chapter  6:  Energy  and  Basic  Petrochemicals 
The  specific  aspects  of  the  US-Canada  energy  trade,  as  set  out  in  the 
Energy  chapter  of  the  FTA,  will  continue  to  apply  between  the  two 
countries.  The  NAFTA  provisions  incorporate  the  GATT  disciplines. 
With  regard  to  National  Security  Measures,  no  party  may  adopt  or 
maintain  a  measure  restricting  imports  of  an  energy  or  basic 
petrochemical  good  from  another  Party.  Mexico,  however,  has  secured  an 
exemption  from  this  clause  and  Is  free  from  any  obligations  in  this 
area. 
Chapter  7:  Agriculture  and  Sanitary  and  Phytosanltary Measures 
The  rules  of  the  Canada/US  FTA  on  tariff  and  non-tariff  barriers  will 
continue  to  apply  to  agricultural  trade  between  the  two  countries.  The 
three  NAFTA  members  have  agreed  to  eliminate  all  tariff  and  non-tariff 
barriers  on  their  agricultural  trade  over  a  period  of  fifteen  years,  -
with  the  exception of  dairy  products  including eggs,  poultry  and  sugar. 
Each  Party  may  adopt  Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  measures  necessary  for 
the  protection  of  human,  animal  or  plant  life  including  a  measure~ 
stringent  than  an  International  standard,  guide! lne  or  recommendation. 
Chapter  8:  Emergency  Action 
If  imports  from  one  NAFTA  member  causes  or  threatens  to  cause  serious 
injury  to  a  domestic  industry,  that  NAFTA  country  may  take  a  safeguard 
action  that  temporarily  suspends  the  agreed  duty  elimination  or  re-
establ !shes  the  pre-NAFTA  rate of  duty. 
Chapter  9:  Technical  Barriers  to Trade  I  Standards-Related Measures 
This  chapter  establishes  the  right  to  take standards-related measures  to 
prohibit  the  importation of.a good  of  another  party  that  fai Is  to  comply 
with  the  reQuirements  of  the  importing  Party. 
Although  there  is  a  general  obi igation  to  treat  the  other  Parties 
regulations  as  eQuivalent,  the  burden  of  proof  of  eQuivalence  remains  on 
the  exporting  country. 
Chapter  10:  Government  Procurement 
The  chapter  on  government  procurement  goes  beyond  the  existing  GATT 
Agreement  on  Government  Procurement  to  which  the  US  and  Canada  (but  not 
Mexico)  are  parties.  It  is strictly  limited  to undertakings  established 
in  the  territories of  the  three  NAFTA  members. 
Chapter  11:  Investment 
Each  country  shall  treat  NAFTA  investors  and  their  investments  no  less 
favourab 1  y  than  its  own  investors  (i.e.  Nat iona I  Treatment)  and 
investors of  third countries  (i.e.  MFN  Treatment). 
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Chapter  12:  Cross-Border  Trade  In  Services 
The  cross-border  trade  in  services  provisions  establishes  a  set  of 
basic  rules  and  obi igations  to  faci I itate  trade  between  the  three 
countries.  Each  Party  shal I  accord  to  service providers of  another  Party 
treatment  no  less  favourable  than  that  it  accords  to  its  own  service 
providers. 
The  definition  of  cross-border  services  Includes  movement  of  natural 
persons.  Under  the  Agreement,  no  Party  may  require  a  service  ~rovider 
of  another  Party  to  establish or  maintain  a  representative office or  to 
be  resident  in  its  territory  as  a  condition  for  the  cross-border 
provision  of  a  service.  The  conditions  of  this  chapter  do  not  apply  to 
Financial  Services  as defined  in  chapter  14. 
Chapter  13:  Telecommunications 
Each  Party  shal I  have  access  to  and  use  of  any  public  telecommunications 
transport  network  or  service  (including private-leased circuits) offered 
In  its  territory or  across  its borders. 
These  provisions  only  relate  to  enhanced  services  (or  value-added 
services).  The  networks  themselves  are  outside  the  scope  of  the 
Agreement. 
Chapter  14:  Financial  Services 
There  is  a  general  recognition of  principle allowing  the  investor  of  one 
Party  to  establish  a  financial  institution  in  the  territory  of  another 
NAFTA  Party. 
Canada  wl  I I  el lminate  its restrictions on  foreign  ownership  of  Canadian 
financial  institutions  and  on  total  domestic  assets  of  foreign  bani< 
subsIdiarIes  In  Canada  QDJ.Y.  vIs-a-vis  companIes  cont ro I I  ed  by  US  or 
Mexican  nationals  (excluding  US  and  Mexican  subsidiaries  of  Community 
financial  Institutions). 
Chapter  15:  Competition  Pol  icY.  Monopolies  and  State  Enterprises 
Each  Party  will  adopt  or  maintain  measures  against  anti-competitive 
business  practices  and  will  cooperate  on  issues  of  competition  law 
enforcement  and  other  competition  Issues. 
With  regard  to Monopolies  and  State Enterprises,  there  is  nothing  in  the 
Agreement  that  prevents  the  Parties  from  maintaining  or  establishing 
monopolies  or  state enterprises. 
Chapter  16:  Temporary  Entry  For  Business  Persons 
The  NAFTA  faci I itates  on  a  reciprocal  basis,  temporary  entry  into  their 
respective  territories of  business  persons  who  are  citizens of  the  three 
Parties.  The  Agreement  does  DQ1  create  a  common  market  for  the  movement 
of  labour.  Each  Party  maintains  its  rights  to  protect  the  permanent 
employment  base  of  its  domestic  labour  force,  to  implement  its  own 
Immigration  policies  and  to  protect  the  security of  its borders. 
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Chapter  17:  Intellectual  Property 
To  provide 
commitments 
designs etc. 
effective  protection  of 
Including:  copyrights, 
IPRs,  NAFTA  sets  out  specific 
patents,  trademarks,  industrial 
An  exempt ion  from  the  Intellectual  Property  provisions  for  Cultural 
Industries  was  agreed  for  Canada. 
Chapter  18:  Publ !cation.  Notification  and  Administration of  Laws 
Standard  procedures  for  above. 
Chapter  19:  Review  and  Dispyte  Settlement 
Countervai 1 lng  Duty  Matters 
in  Anti-Dumping  and. 
Each  Party  reserves  the  right  to  apply  its  anti-dumping  law  and 
counterva IIi ng  I  aw  to  goods  imported  from  the  terri tory  of  any  other 
Party. 
The  Parties  to  a  dispute  may  choose  to  appeal  to  a  NAFTA  panel  rather 
than  use  the  procedures  available  under  GATT,  even  for  matters  clearly 
related  to  GATT. 
Chapter  20:  ~l~n~s~t~i~t~u~t~i~o~n~a~I--~A~r~r~a~n~g~e~m~e~n~t~s~  __  :a~n=d--~D~i~s~p~u~t~e~--~S~e~t~t~l~e~m~e~n~t 
Procedures 
Establ !shes  the  institutions  responsible  for  implementing  the  Agreement 
Including  a  Trade  Commission  (comprising  of  Ministers  or  Cabinet-level 
officers  designated  by  each  of  the  Parties)  and  a  Secretariat  to  serve 
the  Commission. 
Chapter  21:  Exceptions 
The  scope of  exceptions  includes 
and  Balance  of  Payments.  With 
Agreement  sha I I  be  governed  in 
Canada/US  Free  Trade  Agreement. 
Chapter  22:  Final  Provisions 
Included  In  the  Final  Provisions: 
Articles on  National  Security,  Taxation 
respect  to  Cultural  Industries,  the 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
(a)  Accession:  Any  country  or  group  of  countries  may  accede  to  this 
Agreement,  subject  to  such  terms  and  conditions  as  may  be  agreed  between 
the original  NAFTA  partners  and  such  country or  countries. 
(b)  Withdrawal:  A Party  may  withdraw  from  the  Agreement  six  months  after 
it  provides  written  notice  of  withdrawal  to  the  other  Parties.  If  a 
Party  does  withdraw,  the  Agreement  remains  in  force  for  the  remaining 
Parties. 
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